KANT, NORMATIVITY AND RELIGION

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KANT, NORMATIVITY AND RELIGION

The workshop will take place at Boğaziçi University, on Friday June 29th from 1pm until 6.30pm in JF507. Everyone is welcome.

Schedule:

1.00 – 2.15:    Martin Sticker (Dublin) “Kant on Beneficence”

2.15 – 3.30     Emine Hande Tuna (Brown) “Objective Purposiveness and Value”

4.00 – 5.15     Taylan Susam (Brown) “Upon this rock: Kant on the Churches Visible and Invisible”

5.15 – 6.30     Saniye Vatansever (Bilkent) “Kant on Miracles”

The conference is organised a part of the joint Boğaziçi -Southampton Newton-Katip Çelebi project “Agency and Autonomy: Kant and the Normative Foundations of Republican Self-Government”, run by Lucas Thorpe (Boğaziçi) and Andrew Stephenson (Southampton).

Talk at Bosphorus

Talk by Hande Tuna at Bosphorus

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Imaginative Resistance and Disgust

Emine Hande TUNA

Friday, 22 June 2018, 15–17:00, JF507

ABSTRACT: The phenomenon of imaginative resistance refers to the psychological difficulties we might have in engaging with the particular imaginative activities prompted by works of fiction. To get a grip on this, suppose that Crime and Punishment were modified so that the narrator told us that Raskolnikov’s crime was the morally right thing to do. Even though we would then have no problem imagining the rest of the story as it is and accepting the narrator’s authority in telling us what is true in the story, we encounter a problem imagining that Raskolnikov is indeed morally justified. A related question immediately arises: Does this problem we experience in trying to imagine the modified parts of Crime and Punishment compromise the work aesthetically? This problem opens up an explanatory lacuna as well as a possibility for understanding the relationship between the ethical and aesthetic dimensions of our engagement with works of art. Unfortunately, although some valuable diagnoses have emerged in recent work on the phenomenon (genre and gender make a difference), on the whole the discussion has been straying away from this original research question. In this talk I will attempt to provide an alternative interpretation of the phenomenon, which not only furnishes a theoretical framework that can accommodate these compelling diagnoses but also helps to highlight a specific instance of imaginative resistance that might give us interesting insights with respect to the causes of aesthetic displeasure. I argue that the reason why we find it almost impossible to engage in the imaginative activity prompted by a fictional work is grounded not only in the moral disapprobation it generates but also in the emotion of disgust that mingles with and amplifies the disapprobation.

“Out of Sight, Out of Mind” @ 2018 APA Pacific

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I will be giving a talk on imaginative resistance at the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division meeting in San Diego, on March 29, Thursday @ 5pm. In this paper, I criticize some of the recent trends in imaginative resistance research and put forward a positive account.

The phenomenon of imaginative resistance refers to the inability or unwillingness to engage with the particular imaginative activities prompted by works of fiction. For instance, suppose that Crime and Punishment were modified so that the narrator told us that Raskolnikov’s crime was the morally right thing to do. Even though we would then have no problem imagining the rest of the story as it is and accepting the author’s authority in telling us what is true in the story, there seems to be a problem imagining that Raskolnikov would be morally justified.

In the first part of my paper, I criticize some of the recent positions on imaginative resistance (Shen-yi Liao, Nina Strohminger, and Chandra Sekhar Sripada (2014) and Shen-yi Liao (forthcoming)), which I believe are contributing to the trend of straying away from the original promise of imaginative resistance research. But also, I want to acknowledge some of their strengths as well, particularly a compelling diagnosis they make (i.e. genre makes a difference). In the second part, I provide my own interpretation of the phenomenon and show that my interpretation also provides the theoretical framework to account for this compelling diagnosis. I argue that the reason why we find it almost impossible to engage in the imaginative activity prompted by a fictional work is grounded not only in moral disapprobation it creates but also in the emotion of disgust that mingles with and amplifies the disapprobation.