My forthcoming book, Kantian Art Criticism, to be published by Cambridge University Press, argues that Kant’s aesthetic theory, far from precluding the possibility of art criticism, supports a distinctive and compelling model of it. The book challenges the widespread assumption that Kant’s rejection of aesthetic testimony and general principles of taste leaves no room for criticism. If we cannot defer to the critic’s aesthetic judgment or appeal to shared principles, then the critic’s evaluations—such as “Blade Runner is a haunting and masterfully crafted film”—and the descriptions meant to support them—like “its slow pacing, rain-slick cityscapes, and minimalist synth score create existential unease”—can seem, at best, unhelpful, and at worst, worthless. The book addresses that challenge through a two-phase argument. First, it offers a reinterpretation of Kant’s theory of artistic beauty, emphasizing the neglected role of judgments of perfection—non-aesthetic, attributive good judgments such as “Blade Runner is an excellent neo-noir film.” Second, it develops a Kantian model of art criticism in which such judgments inform aesthetic evaluations and are supported by descriptions of non-aesthetic features. By foregrounding this underappreciated dimension of Kant’s theory, the book offers a model of criticism that honors Kant’s core commitments while remaining responsive to the practical demands of critical discourse. It may also be of special interest to those working on German rationalist aesthetics, the role of imagination in aesthetic judgment—particularly how we can form genuine aesthetic responses to imagined or fictional properties of objects—and the conditions under which aesthetic testimony might be legitimate or permissible.